Being that Iran was one of the countries I spent some time studying (but I'll admit, not as much as others) whilst obtaining my degree, I have a fairly good overview of the history and political makeup of the country.  However, being we often forget some of what we read over time, I decided to do some re-research (and some new research).  I not only dusted off some of my old books, but also did some additional research on the current affairs of Iran.

First and foremost, I'd like to bring you to the attention of a paragraph inside one of the books I read for my Iran-Iraq course, The History of Iran, Elton L. Daniel.

In regards to the coup of 1953:

Most important, it was ultimately Iranians who brought Mosaddeq down, not a few American secret agents with a suitcase of cash.  There is abundant evidence that in 1953 many Iranians, probably a large majority, were sympathetic to the shah or relieved, either because of the financial crisis or the continuing public disorder, to see Mosaddeq over-thrown.  Although Mosaddeq claimed to represent the "nation" and the "people," the National Front had less than 10 percent of the seats in the Sixteenth Majles and could not even command a clear majority in the blatantly manipulated Seventeenth Majles. The ease of the coup should have made it obvious just how small and culturally isolated the liberal, secular, and intelledctual nationalist elite around Mosaddeq really was, and how exaggerated its belief in its social influence had become (and would continue to be).

The author goes on to speak of how the traditional and religious classes were of key importance to the coup.

Why is that paragraph so important?  First of all, it brings into focus the reality that the political climate in Iran was already suited for a coup - the CIA might have pushed things along a bit more, but the system in place was not 100% rock solid, and cracks were forming prior to US involvement.  At most, we sped up the process.  This is not to say that I support CIA involvement - it is merely to suggest that US involvement oftentimes comes as a compliment to an already chaotic situation.

Second, let's pay attention to the information regarding Mosaddeq's political party and it's lack of control within the country.  First and foremost, we must recognize that unlike the United States, which has a dual-party system, Iran has multiple parties that hold great influence within the political framework of the nation.  Ahmadenijad is a member of one of the newest political parties in Iran - the Abadgaran.  The Abadgaran is an alliance of conservative older men *usually above age 50* who are normally non-clerics.  Overall, the conservatives in general, regardless of political party garner about 25% of the voting population.

The Abadgaran is a smaller party, concentrated mostly in Tehran, but they did hold well in the 2004 Majlis election.  However, the 2006 Iranian Councils Election (city councils throughout the country) & the Assembly of Experts Election were a major blow to the Abadgaran, as Ahmadenijad-backed candidates lost most of the elections.  Let us be clear - the Assembly of Experts are the Islamic Scholars who can remove Ayatollah Khamenei as Supreme Leader and replace him with someone else.  Iranian political analysts believed that these elections were a litmus test for the country - proving that the people wished to move towards a more moderate government.

For people to assume that Ahmadenijad would have enough support within the rural areas fails to take into account the reality that he has not been as popular in his country since he took office - people are upset over his handling of the national economy, major conflicts between himself and parliament, the nuclear issue, and general international affairs (among others).  Protesters on the streets in Iran are of all ages and backgrounds (though you'll obviously see more young people, being 70% of Iranians are under age 30).  Clerics are beginning to outwardly become involved - some even being seen leading groups of protesters. 

I think there is plenty of information out there to show that the country has not been unified under Ahmadenijad, and considering there are many clerics in Qom sitting on the Assembly of Experts, we might see some interesting events transpire which have nothing to do with the United States, but instead, have everything to do with normal socio-political splits within the country.

Unlike some on these blogs, I'll provide intelligent commentation on this situation (as I always try to do).

1) Iran has been kicking out and/or kidnapping journalists.  Why?

2) Why was there no international monitoring of the election?

3) Why are Iranians being killed by other Iranians?  Most Iranians agree that such an act is reprehensible in their religion and culture.

4) The is verified proof that election fraud did occur.  The question is whether or not the Iranian Government is being honest regarding the extent of the fraud.

5) If this was only a "student" uprising, why are many non-students and highly influential political leaders also involved?

6) Why is the Iranian Government doing everything it can to repress communication with the outside world?  Most recent news I've received via Iran is that blockades are set up in parts of Tehran tonight, and cameras are being confiscated.

7) Why were hellicopters being used to drop suspicious chemicals on protesters?

8) How could election results be verified within 2 hours from the close of the polls? Let's remember that these are paper ballots.. and many of the polling places were in rural areas.

9) Why are the Religious Clerics in Qom considering getting rid of both Khamenei and Ahmadenijad if they didn't have suspicions about the election? 

10) I've read unconfirmed reports that Mousavi was in Qom earlier today meeting with said Clerics.  If they believed as the Ayatollah does that he's responsible for the current unrest, wouldn't they have him arrested?

11) If police aren't allowed to use lethal force, why are the Basij allowed?

12) The home is a very private place in Iranian culture - why are private residences being raided in the night by Basij?

12) Why are Iranian families not able to see the loved ones currently jailed for protesting?

I'm sure that there are many other questions wandering around in my mind.. but these are the ones that, to me, point to major issues within Iran, and I don't think the CIA is involved.

www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/06/21/76567.html

The Iranian government must understand that the world is watching. We mourn each and every innocent life that is lost. We call on the Iranian government to stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people. The universal rights to assembly and free speech must be respected, and the United States stands with all who seek to exercise those rights.

As I said in Cairo, suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away. The Iranian people will ultimately judge the actions of their own government. If the Iranian government seeks the respect of the international community, it must respect the dignity of its own people and govern through consent, not coercion.

Martin Luther King once said - "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." I believe that. The international community believes that. And right now, we are bearing witness to the Iranian peoples’ belief in that truth, and we will continue to bear witness.

I found this to be an interesting read...

www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1905237,0 0.html

For a number of weeks, I've been noticing a couple of commercials, most notably being aired on CNN from "United Against Nuclear Iran," in which there is a call for further economic sanctions against the country.  I feel that not only are these ads misleading because they do not admit how our government's involvement in Iran led up to the '79 revolution (and the harsh treatment thereafter has had no real affect on positive relations), but they are also airing in a completely inappropriate time.

I predicted a year ago that Ahmadenijad would not be re-elected in 2009 based upon a number of factors - most notably his sinking popularity among many groups of people - most notably those under the age of 30 (who happen to make up about 70% of the population).  Up until a few months ago, my prediction held steadfast - especially when Khatami entered the race.  Unfortunately, Khatami soon bowed out and put his support behind Mousavi, which ultimately changed Ayatollah Khamenei's support towards Ahmadenijad, which makes no real sense, considering Khamenei has not supported Ahmadenijad's extremely radical stances on both internal and external affairs.

Being that we have limited information to what is going on currently, it is difficult to verify if there was indeed electoral fraud, but based upon my earlier research and litmus tests, I'll go with my gut and agree that fraud most likely did take place.  For example, with the current "results" taken into account, if the voting population is an accurate representation of the country as a whole, 70% of all ballots cast would have been by young people.  This means that those under the age of 30 would have supported Ahmadenijad over Mousavi more tha 2 to 1.  Based upon all available information, I'd say this is highly unlikely.

So - what's my point in all of this?  The current demonstrations show many similarities with those that led to the '79 revolution, and they also show similarities to revolts 10 years ago, in which the protestors (mostly college-age) chanted "death to the dictator (Khamenei)."  However, there are some key differences.  I'll spare everyone and focus on one major difference which was brought to my attention whilst watching CNN a while ago - 10 years ago, you wouldn't have seen middle or older aged citizens protesting, and you definitely wouldn't see major political figures involved either.  This, combined with evidence that the Iranian regime isn't as cohesive as it once was, indicates to me that there is the potential for a revolution within the country.  Even if such an event doesn't occur soon, the impact on the current situation will have long-lasting implications that just might aid in a shift on current policy.

Therefore, for the United States to pressure Iran during this time period would be un-wise, as we are seeing the seeds of more coherent thought - as more Iranians support a less theocratic and more secular Iran, the more they support the ability to come to the diplomatic table with the West.  Let us not forget that we have had a major part to play in Iranian policy for the past 6+ decades.  Obama's call towards better relations can and will have a positive impact on our relationship with our foe, and might even lead to a more stable and friendly Iran.  Khamenei's response to Obama is a crucial piece of the puzzle:

"We are observing, watching and judging. If you change, we will also change our behavior. If you do not change, we will be the same nation as 30 years ago."

Regardless of what happens in Iran - whether Ahmadenijad retains control of the Presidency or not, whether Khamenei's rule as Supreme Leader will be challenged or not, the reality is that our treatment of Iran in previous years has not given them the confidence that we are willing to work together to solve our differences.  If we want positive results, we must approach the issues with open eyes and ears, instead of ill demands and unwillingness to listen. If we're lucky, the government of Iran will soon be changing to help meet our common interests and goals.