For those daring enough to read it, this was my Senior Thesis in college:

Crimes Against Humanity in Iraqi Kurdistan and the United States Reponse

1983-1991

On March 16, 1988, more than 6,000 Kurdish civilians in the northern Iraqi town of Halabja lost their lives in a chemical weapons attack perpetrated by the Iraqi Military, part of an operation called “Al-Anfal.”  This event was one of many which convinced such organizations as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to label the Iraqi Kurdish people as being victims of crimes against humanity.  Since the 1980’s, Iraq has been a major focal point of United States foreign policy and interest.  With a push towards better diplomatic relations with Iraq in the early part of that decade, the United States aided President Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.  At the time of the Halabja incedent, United States foreign policy prohibited the nation from actively punishing Saddam Hussein for a crime against humanity.   

Background: The Kurds

In order to fully understand the Kurdish issue, it is important to give a short overview of who the Kurds are, and how they have become a threatened minority in the Middle East.  The Kurds have had a presence in the region since the beginnings of recorded history.  They have always been known to the region as being very independent, and have revolted against conquering forces on many occasions  For many years, the peoples of “Kurdistan” were not collectively unified, as many Kurdish peoples were of nomadic tribes.  Therefore a collective Kurdish identity took thousands of years to form, and is best seen with the coming of the Medes in the seventh century B.C.; who are revered by historians as the first “authentic expression of Kurdish culture and language.[1]” 

After the Arabization of the Middle East, especially during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds began to distance themselves even further from the rest of the region.  These peoples have a very complex society: not all Kurds speak the same language or follow the same religion – important factors usually associated with nationalism.  Therefore, it is important to recognize that the growing issues between the Kurds and their Arab neighbors have been a collection of issues including racial identity, language, culture, politics and religion. 

From the decline of the Ottoman Empire onward, independence became a major rallying point of the Kurds.  During World War I, Britain and France secretly signed the Sykes-Picot agreement which would divide up the Ottoman Empire into a number of mandates which would eventually become independent countries[2].  A few years later in 1920, the Kurds were given hope when articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres called for Kurdish independence:

“…east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia… If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas[3].”

However, thanks in part to Turkish revolutionaries, as well as British colonial intentions, the Kurds would not gain a homeland.  Instead, the countries of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey would all contain portions of the Kurdish lands.

Iraq: The Kurds, Saddam Hussein and the United States

Fast forwarding a number of decades, with the emergence of the Baath party under the leadership of Saddam Hussein in the 1970’s, the Iraqi Kurds attempted to gain several important concessions, but ran into continuous problems which resulted in heated hostilities and guerilla warfare.  In 1975, Saddam Hussein ordered the mass deportation of the Kurdish population occupying a 15-Kilometer deep area lining the Iranian and Syrian borders, creating a “no man’s land” which drove more Kurds to the guerilla movement against Iraq[4]. 

When Saddam Hussein ordered the attacks which would begin the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurds would be placed into a role which would influence much of the political and military decisions of the conflict.  The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani, looked upon the war as an opportunity, but were limited to the guerilla attacks which they had been partaking in for a number of years[5].  In fact, the KDP and their rivals the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talibani, spent most of their time fighting each other, as well as the smaller Communist parties of the region. 

During the war, the Iranian government decided to influence the political opposition within Iraq, including these Kurdish political parties[6].  Iranian financial aid, combined with Baghdad’s lenient policies in the Kurdish region during this time allowed both the KDP and PUK to regain control of the majority of Kurdish lands.  This both created a free area in which Kurds could avoid the Iraqi draft and also convinced Saddam Hussein to form an alliance with the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in order to regain some sort of authority in the region.  Unbeknownst to Hussein, Talibani was conducting negotiations with Iran at the same time[7].  Iran also began to support the KDP of Iraq in 1986, which would eventually pave the way for a united alliance between all major Kurdish parties in Iraq in 1987, which was titled the Kurdish National Front[8].  This group would fight alongside Iran in the final offensive of 1987, but their actions would not go unpunished for very long.

Meanwhile, during the Iran-Iraq war, the United States began to make a diplomatic shift towards Iraq.  In 1982, The United States removed Iraq from the State Department’s list of States which supported terrorism, which enabled Saddam Hussein to gain credit to once again trade with the United States[9].  With the Islamic revolution in Iran developing less than desired results for United States foreign policy, the nation began to maintain more of an economic and diplomatic relationship with Iraq, under the idea that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’  In 1984, the United States publicly condemned Iran for not backing down until Saddam Hussein was ousted from power, stating that, “The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims.[10]"   From 1982 to 1988, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided detailed information on Iranian deployments, as well as tactical plans for military movement and air strikes[11].

Though the United States officially refused to sell weapons or weapons technologies to either Iran or Iraq during the 1980’s, it has been proven after investigations in 1990 that dual-use equipment and technology had been approved for export to the Iraqi air force, ministry of defense, missile research, military production and explosives and proprellants research and production labs[12].  Beginning in 1983, the United States made available export credit guarantees issued by the Commodity Credit Corporation.  This program opened up a large market for American farmers and exporters of agricultural goods, and was supported by many agricultural groups and representatives of congress, as the U.S. benefited greatly from this multi-billion dollar program[13].  As far as the Iraqi Chemical and Biological weapons programs, the U.S. viewed the continued issue as a “public relations problem for Iraq,” and valued a continued U.S.-Iraqi relationship over the weapons issue[14].

Operation Al-Anfal

After the Iranian acceptance of UN Resolution 598 on August 20, 1988 which called for a cease-fire, Iraq was in the position to turn its attention back on the Kurdish population of the country.  However, Baghdad had been actively punishing the Kurds prior to this ceasefire.  While the some of the Kurds targeted can be considered military targets, Article I of the Genocide Convention affirms that, “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law[15].” Human Right’s Watch reports state that on June 8, 1987, Iraqi soldiers used a truck with a multiple rocket launcher mounted on it to launch chemical shells on the villages of Bergalou, Haladin and Sekaniyan, causing ‘limited’ casaulties[16]. On November 23, 1987, Iraq dropped “Thallium poison when trying to kill 40 Kurdish separatists,” as reported by Amnesty International[17].      

Operation “Al-Anfal” itself means “spoils of war,” and was developed in eight different stages throughout 1988.  In February of 1988, Ali Hasan Majid, cousin to Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist in charge of Iraqi Kurdistan issued the Al-Anfal decree: “the greater part of Iraqi Kurdistan was decreed off-limits to man or beast.  Anyone or anything found in the prohibited zone was to be killed[18].  The first official and most well-known account of Iraqi use of Chemical Weapons was in March on the Kurdish town of Halabja on March 16 and 17.  According to reports, Iraqi aircraft bombed the town as well as nearby villages, using mustard and sarin nerve-gas bombs, killing around 5,000 people[19].  Iraqi soldiers returned with protective clothing to Halabja, divided the city into grids, and studied the results of the attack, determining the extent of death and injury for further development of Hussein’s chemical warfare tactics[20]

The second account of Iraqi use of Chemical weapons against the Kurdish Population came on April 13, 1987, as reported by the Islamic Republican News Agency, when Iraqi forces bombed a number of Kurdish villages in order to regain control after a joint Iran-Iraq Kurdish PUK operation[21].  In response to the heightened Kurdish problem, Iraqi forces began a series of operations forcing the removal of an estimated 800,000 inhabitants of the border regions, thereby creating “free-fire zones” which would allow freedom of movement for Iraqi troops[22].   On August 25, 1988, a force of 30,000 troops supported by armored divisions, tanks and aircraft began an offensive in the Kurdish areas, which provoked Massoud Barzani to ask the United Nations to persuade Iraq not to use Chemical weapons on some, “150,000 villagers living alongside the Turkish border.[23]”  This was in response to eyewitness accounts of the chemical attack of Birjinni on the 25^th.  “Observers recall seeing a plume of black, then yellowish smoke, followed by a not-unpleasant odor similar to fertilizer, and also a smell like rotten garlic. Shortly afterwards, villagers began to have trouble breathing, their eyes watered, their skin blistered, and many vomited--some of whom died. All of these symptoms are consistent with a poison gas attack.[24]”  Scientific tests conducted in 1993 concluded that it was conclusive that the eyewitness accounts were, in fact, correct – traces of degradation of nerve and mustard agents in the soil[25].

Fears of more attacks caused thousands upon thousands of Kurdish refugees to flee to Turkey, where they were first denied entrance.  It was reported that as few as 56,377 to as many as 90,000 refugees were allowed into Turkish camps by the end of the week[26].  On September 9, however, Turkey closed its borders with Iraq, citing that it needed $30 million in economic aid to support the more than 60,000 refugees already in the country.  On October 14, Iran followed suit and closed off its borders to the Kurds.

As the Iraqi offensive continued, more reports of alleged chemical weapons attacks began to appear.  It was reported that a chemical attack commenced near Kirkuk on October 11^th, and a second attack near Suliemaniyeh three days later, killing at least 50 Kurds[27].  Iraqi officials continually denied claims that they had ordered the use of Chemical weapons, but the Organization of Human Rights in Iraq (OHRI), based in London, claimed that a team of American doctors working in the Turkish refugee camps had been treating people who had evidential symptoms of a chemical attack.  OHRI also claimed that Iraqi leaders held hundreds of thousands as political prisoners, and blamed “gas and extermination tactics” for the continued Kurdish emigration to Turkey and Iran[28].

United States Response

It was as early as December of 1982 that the United States Congress became aware of the mistreatment of the Kurds by Iraq.  On December 6, Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin addressed the chambers about a letter which had been published to the New York Times in October of that year[29].  This letter addressed the plights of the Kurds in the middle east, and specifically addressed concerns about the Iraqi Kurds.  Mr. Proxmire, addressing the Senate President, stated that it, “…reminds us that the potential for genocide still exists in the world today.  And although Americans detest such oppression, our Nation has not done all that it could to end this heinous practice.[30]”  Senator Proxmire went even further by speaking about the ratification of the convention for Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, of which more than 80 nations, sans the United States, had signed.  “By neglecting to ratify the treaty, the United States fails short of its duty as leader in the area of international human rights… I urge the Senate to act now.[31]”  No record of congressional response to Senator Proxmire’s urgings were ever recorded.

Again, Senator Proxmire would address the U.S. Senate on the Kurdish issue, on October 3, 1983.  The Senator once again specifically addressed the plight of the Iraqi Kurds, informing his peers of Kurdish involvement in the Iran-Iraq war.  He stated that the Kurds, “… have been, and continue to be, the target of systematic efforts… to uproot, disperse, and extinguish their society.[32]”  While the Senator could not say that the Kurdish problem was one of Genocide, he firmly believed that the Kurds were indeed victims of many human rights violations.  It seems that Senator Proxmire was attempting to warn the United States of an impending issue, but the United States was not willing to listen.  In fact, intelligence records show that the United States did, in fact, know of Iraq’s almost daily use of chemical agents against Iranian troops

On March 24, 1988, Congressman Tom Lantos addressed the House of Representatives about the March 16^th attack on Halabja.  The initial reaction from the United States Department of Defense was that the attack was the fault of Iran, considering Halabja was located only 10 miles from the Iraqi border with Iran[33].  Representative Lantos expressed his outrage of the current situation in Iraq, stating that it was unclear if 3,000 or 5,000 men, women and children had died because the media was not present.  He also expressed his concern for current U.S. protection of Iraq and its allies, “The administration must use its leverage with the regime in Baghdad to convince them that mass poisoning of its own civilian population is unacceptable in the eyes of civilized nations.  The United Nations must send a mission to investigate this barbaric mass murder – and it must do so immediately.[34]”

Five days later on March 29^th, another congressman - a Mr. Atkins, addressed concerns over the chemical attacks and ill treatment of the Kurds.  Atkins proposed the introduction of legislation later in the week which would condemn the use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq, and he urged his fellow congresspersons to support such a proposal[35].  The next day, Congressman Lantos informed his fellow peers of an air-led attack on Kurdish Peshmerga (soldiers of the Kurdish Revolutionary Army) camps only 1 kilometer from the Turkish border.  Mr. Lantos was worried that Iraq might follow Kurdish refugees into Turkey, and expressed his concern for the possible consequences of such an action.

On April 2, a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported confirming reports of the removal of Kurds from the border regions, and that they believed that Kurdish and Iranian attacks on Iraqi forces would be increased[36].  Reports continued to come out of the Baghdad embassy during Al-Anfal, many of which still remain carefully edited[37].  Meanwhile, congress continued to decry the conditions and Iraq, and continuously demanded United States response to the issue.  However, the U.S. did little if nothing to stop Saddam Hussein from continuing his chemical weapons attacks. On June 24, 1988, the United States Senate voted 91-0 (with 9 abstentions) in support of Resolution 408, which officially condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and declared it a violation of international law[38].  The resolution also commended President Reagan for condemning the attacks, and implored him to support ways in which to stop and prevent the use of chemical weapons.  There was no official response from the State Department or Reagan administration on this resolution.  In August, the United Nations Sub-committee on Human rights voted not to condemn Iraq for Human Rights violations by a vote of 11 to 8 – the United States being one of the eleven[39].

As operation Al-Anfal crept through its various stages, the United States continued to monitor the situation without making a solid attempt to stop the Iraqi forces.  In fact, prior to September, 1988, there are no available State Department documents which would suggest that the U.S. was doing otherwise.  It would not be until after the official amnesty that the State Department would actively address the chemical weapons issue. This amnesty came on September 8, 1988 with the release of Decree number 736 of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council which stated, “…a general and comprehensive amnesty for all Iraqi Kurds… both inside and outside of Iraq” (except for the Kurdish leader Al-Talibani)[40].  Though the international community was considerably upset with Iraq over its human rights violations, there is no evidence which would suggest that outside pressure was the major contributing factor to the end of Operation Al-Anfal.  

Records indicate that on September 8, a briefing from Deputy Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy to Secretary of State George P. Shultz addressed the continued concerns of the Anfal campaign[41].  In this memo, Murphy outlined the positions that Schultz was to take on Iraqi issues in his meeting with Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi.  Murphy outlines that Iraq had committed major violations of international human rights standards, and asked that Shultz would address these concerns with Hammadi.  “Military actions against Kurdish Civilians, use of chemical weapons… would make it difficult for us to promote development of our relations.[42]”  In the same memo, it is stated that the United States wishes for a continued support of commercial relations with Iraq.  On the same day, Shultz had released another memo, in response to the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, passed unanimously in the U.S. Senate, stating that, “The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is… important to our long-term political and economic objectives.  We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis.[43]” 

A little over a month later on October 13, Deputy Secretary Murphy spoke to the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee[44].  In this statement, he noted that President Ronald Reagan had asked the UN General Assembly in September to reinforce the chemical weapons ban of the 1925 Geneva Convention.  While the statements of the Deputy Secretary indicated that the United States did not condone the use of chemical weapons, they do not indicate that the United States was taking the issue seriously.  Instead of specifically indicating potential consequences for continued use of chemical weapons, the Reagan administration’s continued response was that, “… they [Iraq] cannot have good relations with us and continue to use chemical weapons.[45]” 

Murphy insisted that on September 17^th, Iraq re-affirmed its commitment to the 1925 Geneva protocol on chemical weapons; and that since that date, no evidence of use of chemical weapons had been found.  While it is true that Iraq had denounced its use of chemical weapons, as stated earlier, reports indicate that chemical attacks continued starting October 11, 1988[46]. Therefore, it cannot be said that Iraq ended chemical attacks, nor would they end then due to U.S. pressure, considering there is no evidence of a concerted effort to force Saddam to end the Anfal campaign.  Nizar Hamdoon, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States had stated 13 days prior to the reaffirmation of Geneva that he thought the fighting would be over within a few days[47].  Considering that the entire operation had specific objectives, it is safe to say that this final Anfal was ending when Saddam wanted it to, and not when the U.S. wished it to end. 

Ironically, on September 9, 1988, 3 days after the official amnesty of the Anfal campaign, a secret overview of United States policy towards Iraq was released inside the State Department.  This document outlines the U.S. outlook and objectives regarding Iraq.  In it, it is clearly stated that the United States had and wished to continue with a business relationship with Iraq.  The United States and Iraq were in negotiations for billions of dollars worth of, “enormous projects for oilfield development, irrigation, power generation, and other major infrastructure projects[48].”  With that being said, the paper emphasizes the U.S. concern for the issue of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.  While the document lists almost a dozen possible ideas with which to sanction Iraq, it is also noted in conclusion that, “The disadvantages to all these actions are obvious.  In differing degrees, they would have a sharp negative impact on our ability to influence the Iraqi regime, and set in motion a downward spiral of action and reaction which would be unpredictable and uncontrollable.[49]”  This very statement seems to mirror the exact sentiment which the State Department had adopted while the Anfal campaign was still officially ongoing.  While congressional leaders continued to propose legislation against Iraq and decry its human rights violations, the Reagan administration would not support anything that might have harmed the economic and diplomatic relationship between the two countries.  Unwilling to lose an important ally against Islamic fundamentalism, the United States refused to take action, and instead placed this responsibility on the United Nations[50].

Continued Human Rights Violations After Al-Anfal

While the Al-Anfal campaign was officially called to an end on September 6, 1988, there is ample evidence that the Kurdish population was still subjected to many forms of inhumane punishment and criminal acts.  Kurds who had fled from Northern Iraq were only allowed to re-enter the country at one of two approved entry points where reception camps had been set up, and had only a month to do so, lest they be taken into military custody[51].  Only after being processed through a “returnee reception committee,” under control of the Ba’athist party, were these refugees able to re-enter the country[52].  Even then, they would be forced into one of a dozen assigned complexes where they could build new homes.  These reallocation camps were often times overcrowded and poorly sanitized.  Those who returned to Iraq were forced to sign a statement binding them to the assignment they had been given, under the threat of death if they attempted to move or lie about their place of residence.  This is a direct violation of Article 13 (1) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Northern Bureau of the Ba’athist party, headed by Ali Hassan al-Majid further punished the returning Kurds by decreeing that those who “benefited from decree no. 736 of September 6, 1988” were not guaranteed to be treated as equals of other Iraqi citizens or the Kurds who had remained in Iraq during Al-Anfal[53].  These Kurds were denied the rights to participate in the government, could not sell, buy or own land and were continually watched by Iraqi authorities.  The denial of these rights is also a violation of the UN charter[54].  Many who had been draft-dodgers or who had deserted the regular Iraqi army were subjected to even worse conditions.  Even with the promises of Amnesty, Kurdish resistance leaders were not convinced, and were able to keep the majority of refugees from going back to Iraq[55].  Those who did return faced possible imprisonment or mass-relocation.  Those who did not return, however, were never heard from again.  Before, during and after the September 6^th amnesty, Iraqi secret police and soldiers executed, tortured and murdered countless Kurds.  After Gulf War I, in 1991 a large cache of secret Iraqi documents was found and turned over to American authorities.  These documents and files contained first hand accounts, military orders, photos and videotapes of these acts[56].  It is estimated that between 1987 and 1990, more than 3,900 Kurdish villages were bulldozed or bombed – almost every village in Iraqi Kurdistan[57].  Of the 3.5 million Kurds living in northern Iraq, an estimated 1 million were forcibly moved[58].

Analysis and Conclusion

Two years after the Al-Anfal campaign, the United States continued to stand by its same support for Iraq as it had during the chemical attacks.  On April 26, 1990, Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly testified about his recent trip to Iraq before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.  In this testimony, Kelly identified that the major U.S. interest in the middle east is energy, as well as the, “proliferation in the Persian Gulf of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons… human rights would be a central consideration for us.[59]”  Kelly also indicated that Saddam Hussein had publicly denounced U.S. naval presence in the Persian gulf, of which it was believed that Hussein was responding to an editorial which support his overthrow. 

“That reading of the editorial is not consistent with the policy of the U.S. government towards Iraq… we have also been told that Iraqi resent of our criticism of Iraq’s abysmal human rights practices in our 1990 report may have been a factor.  We stand by that report.  It is as accurate a characterization of the human right situation in Iraq as we can make from the facts available to us.[60]” 

As had been previously stated by other State department officials, Kelly once again assured the committee that economic sanctions against Iraq were not being considered, as they were seen as unhelpful to the situation.

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein finally achieved the distinction of being an aggressor in the eyes of the west with his invasion of Kuwait, which sparked the first Persian Gulf War.  United States response was immediate – diplomatic, economic and military sanctions were placed upon Iraq almost as soon as the invasion happened.  As the United States led coalition pushed Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in early 1991, the Kurdish population in the north, and the Shi’ite population in southern Iraq planned to use the current confusion to begin an insurrection against the repressive regime led by Hussein.  Thinking they would receive the support of U.S. forces, the Kurds revolted in March of 1991, but were brutally suppressed by Iraqi forces[61]. 

Peter W. Galbraith, a senior advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations committee who visited Iraqi Kurdistan during the Gulf war period, spoke of the continued plight of the Iraqi Kurds in a staff report to the Senate Committee.

“Iraq’s civil war has cost tens of thousands of lives in the Kurdish and Shi’a regions of the country… more than 2 million Iraqi Kurds have sought refuge on the Iraq-Turkey borders and they are dying at a rate of up to 2,000 a day.  The more than 1 million Kurds languishing in Iraqi resettlement areas are the invisible victims… really concentration camps.  Although President Bush fueled the rebellion inside Iraq by calling on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam Hussein in mid-March… it [the United States] was unprepared to cope with the humanitarian crisis that followed.  In spite of clear warnings, the administration responded too late to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Iraq’s civil war[62].”

Galbraith also gives more insight into why the United States did not do more after the reports of the Anfal campaign.  It seems that secret meetings between the U.S. Director for Northern Gulf Affairs, as well as Senator Claiborne Pel and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani were held in April, 1988, unbeknownst to Secretary of State Shultz.  After protests from Turkey and Iraq, Shultz, surprised and embarrased by the revelation, formulated an order prohibiting contact with the Iraqi opposition.  However, nothing Iraq did prior to the Kurdish insurrection in 1991 changed this policy.

        & nbsp;   As Iraqi forces crushed any and all signs of Kurdish resistance, as many as 500,000 refugees flooded the borders[63].  This posed a very real problem for Turkey and Iran, who could not support the many refugees who were fleeing towards their countries.  Also, with the addition of TV news cameras who were documenting the war, the entire world was presented with pictures of the death and destruction in Iraqi Kurdistan[64].  For the first time ever, the