larger view

Ushering in MacIntyre's Notions of Political Transformation in Modernity

By Richard Poirier

The following is an address presented at the Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia conference at London Metropolitan University June 29 to July 1, 2007.

Part 1

Abstract

MacIntyre asserted in 1976 that entry into the modern world was made with individualism and with the creation of specific types of economic and political institutions which belong to individualism. To be modern is in fact to participate in institutions of this kind and share these concepts. The modern economy, itself a kind of theory initially supplied by Smith and Ricardo, developed in England and became a model for all other economies. The modern state developed in Germany, initiated by Fichte and Hegel, came to become to some degree a model for all other states. Originating in relative independence of each other, the modern economy and the modern state are a mismatch and are necessarily at cross-purposes. This situation is exacerbated by the facts that advanced Western societies are oligarchies disguised as liberal democracies and the major political parties have eliminated philosophy, e.g., first principles, as a component of debate in addressing the modern liberal state's debilitation in executing its limited theoretical role.

Drawing upon my personal notes taken in a course by MacIntyre entitled "Morals, Politics and the Emergence of Modernity" at Boston University in 1976, his subsequent works, and a conversation I had with MacIntyre at the University of Notre Dame in November, 2006, I will present an assessment of the current dysfunctional paralysis in politics and why the timing may be right for MacIntyre's "ethics of human flourishing, politics of resistance and practical utopianism" to resonate with frustrated individuals constantly thwarted in their engagement in practices and attempts to achieve their telos.

Paper

Throughout human history there have been periods of apparent stability followed by periods of mass change sometimes brought about by a process of peaceful political, social or economic change; sometimes by mass hysteria or political revolution. During periods of apparent stability, what are the indicators that mass upheaval looms in the distance? The way the public reacts to various events can provide useful insight. For example, observe how the public reacts to unexpected natural catastrophes such as floods, fires and earthquakes, which remind them of the unpredictable destructive power of nature. Or consider how they react to news of a virus epidemic such as HIV, bird flu or chemical and biological agents that have the capacity to wipe out large segments of the population in a relatively brief period of time. Or observe public reaction to the indiscriminate evil acts of the modern terrorist or a rogue nation-state that seeks to steal the productive resources of a neighbor or desires to impose their religious or ideological beliefs upon the people of other nations through force. Reactions to these types of events can be indicative of the mind-set of a nation and people's proclivity to be moved in a particular direction when confronted with events we generally consider catalysts to major social or political change. Sophisticated research that monitors and predicts public behavior to contingent circumstances exists but is restricted from public view.

Reaction to personal daily annoyances such as getting stopped for a minor driving violation or getting an excessive penalty fee from your bank for exceeding your checking account balance are other indications of what is really going on deep within one's general disposition not typically apparent in one's public persona. Sometimes a general malaise sets in when collectively people begin to realize that their lives are not improving, or are getting worse, and they become overwhelmed with the realization that if things don't change soon their lives will in fact get much worse. Sometimes when conditions improve after long periods of hardship, people become more discontented because they suddenly realize how much they were repressing just to deal with daily survival. Suddenly, their actual conditions are clear to them and indignant anger or existential angst follows.

The lack of any charismatic leader with even a ghost of an idea to lead us out of an indefinable abyss that is progressively spiraling out of control augments public fear. In times of great uncertainty and moral and political decay, people turn to those who can articulate philosophical ideas that appear to define or explain the problem and provide answers in the form of concrete actions that will bring relief. We are living in such a time for reasons that I will detail below. The question before us today is whether Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of a Thomistic Aristotelian tradition possesses the necessary resources to address the political and moral decline and incommensurabilities of the modern liberal state, and whether people would be receptive to such a radical departure from what they have come to perceive as the inevitable chaos of our times.

Alvin Lee, lead singer of the British blues-rock group "Ten Years After," wrote a song in 1971 entitled "I'd Love to Change the World" in which the chorus line continued, "but I don't know what to do. So, I'm leaving it up to you." Well, the question at hand now is: can MacIntyre's ideas change the world? Will the people leave it up to him or like-minded MacIntyreian people who appreciate Aristotelianism to implement a new vision to obtain human flourishing? To answer these questions we need to remind ourselves about the nature of people and define exactly what the problem is that necessitates such a radical shift in perspective to begin to understand the solution. This I will explain first and then turn to how MacIntyre's notions of political transformation could actually be realized in America and possibly elsewhere. If it is successful in the United States and Europe then perhaps these ideas could change the world.

Survival, efficacy and the rewarding states of pride and happiness while engaged in activities we believe will achieve our ends are the motivating factors that impel one to contemplate, investigate and draw conclusions about theoretical and practical knowledge. The distinction between Aristotle's theoretical ( theoria) and practical ( phronesis / praxis) philosophy is of course useful in conceptualizing fundamental concepts that involve theoretical universal laws or principles that contribute to our understanding of our metaphysical, existential and epistemological relationship to universal reality in contrast to our understanding and application of practical principles and techniques we employ in our daily activities to achieve desired results. The question regarding the interrelationship, dependency or independence of Aristotle's, or contemporary, practical philosophy to theoretical philosophy is analogous to the question of whether one can separate particulars from context or human beings and their actions from the environment in which they exist within the universe.

Clearly the realms of theoretical and practical knowledge are interdependent correlatives of authentic wisdom ( sophian) and truth ( aletheia). I, therefore, agree with Alasdair MacIntyre's position (notwithstanding his original argument in After Virtue according to Kelvin Knight) that Aristotle's practical philosophy, which comprises his ethics and politics, needs to be understood in the context of his theoretical philosophy comprising his metaphysics and biology (Knight 2007: 2). I believe the solution to errors that have come to light in Aristotle's theoretical philosophy by the scientific contribution of Galileo, Newton, Darwin and others simply illustrates that it is a human's understanding about so-called 'unchanging forms' or universal principles that requires periodic modifications, not the universals, as such. Revisions can be made to Aristotle's theoretical philosophy without diminishing the underpinning of essential elements of Aristotle's concepts of human excellence, which provide the pathway to one's actuality, completeness or telos.

There are, however, a number of presuppositions that Aristotle took for granted that no longer exist in modernity. The first of course is the small city-state, which was administrated by a polis comprising free citizens whom, according to Aristotle, desired to represent the best interest of their community. Today, we live in various versions of the modern state controlled by professional politicians who comprise an elite stratum of society. Aristotle believed that politicians possess moral and intellectual qualities that provide them with the desire, insight and skill that legitimize their qualifications to effectively rule citizens. By presupposing noble and magnanimous qualities attributed to the aristocracy he envisages that they will unselfishly seek the common good for free members of the city-state. History has abundantly illustrated that it is the rare politician that possesses these admirable qualities. When one reflects upon the political leaders of today's modern state it is sometimes difficult to identify any who possess these qualities, although I know a few. The problem of a lack of intellectual acuity and ethical standards extends to the broader population in modern society as well. Alasdair MacIntyre believes that valid traditional elements of Aristotelianism conflated with Thomistic ideas and fine-tuned by MacIntyre provide the revolutionary resources that can address many of the foundational errors, conflicts and incommensurabilities evident in modernity.

To be able to appreciate the nature of a solution and its chance of implementation, let alone its effectiveness, we must first have an understanding of the vast nature of the problem. I will break it up into three general, but related, areas.

1. Capitalism and Management

2. Politics, Economics and The Modern State

3. Ethics and Moral Relativism

I will offer my understanding of MacIntyre's perspective and my own perspective in areas in which we may agree or disagree. Since philosophers generally find disagreement more stimulating than agreement, I'll begin with certain distinctions between MacIntyre's view, or the view that is most commonly attributed to him by critics of capitalism, and my view of the implications that bear upon human flourishing within capitalism's framework in modernity. I should state that I have worked the better part of my life in a financial management capacity for the three largest multi-national corporations in the entertainment industry as well as owned three small entrepreneurial businesses dedicated to the development and management of talent in the entertainment industry. I acknowledge that my experiences within these practices have informed my perspective, but I am also able to stand outside of the influences of such activity to view these modes of institutional structures within the context of an ongoing historical, social and political development that just happens to occupy its current state at this particular point in time and will undoubtedly yield to the interplay of constituent groups as they continue to participate in the dance of progress that evolves into what we call the future.

Capitalism and Management

MacIntyre asserts that there are systematic and structural deficiencies in capitalism and capitalist management that thwart people's abilities to reach their potential. I concede that there are a number of aspects of capitalism that result in major difficulties for a portion of society. Economic recessions, depressions, inflation, unemployment and obsolescence, which I'll discuss in more detail in the next section on politics, economics and the modern state, are certainly among the difficulties of a capitalist society. There are further problematic trends observable in 21st century America that beg for a solution. In a large number of professional businesses such as major top-tier law firms and certified public accounting firms there is a growing trend to require employees to work inhuman hours per week under incredible stress. For example it is typical at top New York law firms for first-year associates to start with "a pay package that seems impressive: $125,000 a year and a signing bonus as high as $40,000. This pay becomes less impressive when one considers that associates can spend up to eighty hours a week in the office, the average one-bedroom apartment in New York City cost about $2,200 a month, and the typical law school grad is carrying over $80,000 in student loans" (Callahan 2004: 34). David Callahan in The Cheating Culture points out that "entry-level pay is not why people join the corporate law world - they join with the hope that someday they will be able to make partner" (Callahan 2004: 34). He cites one law firm in which the average partner took home nearly $2 million in bonus pay in 2002 and another firm in which partners took home even bigger bonuses. ( American Lawyer July 2003). The problem Callahan explains is that it is next to nil that any of these new law associates will ever ascend to partner no matter how extraordinary they are or to what extent that they have worked long and hard in their pursuit.

Similar problems exist at many public accounting firms where not only young associates, but also the partners feel the heat to "constantly try to prove themselves and justify large bonuses. 'There are few partners at the top and the [competition for] promotion to become partner is very stiff' . . . partners are 'under pressure to keep their revenue up and to keep their clients happy,' says Erick Hille, former manager at KPMG" (Callahan 2004: 145). In Fortune 500 corporations throughout America excessive hours, emphasis on maximizing productivity with fewer employees and the precariousness of job security stemming from globalization, outsourcing, technology and industry consolidation continues to be the norm. These types of issues may be placed under the general category of business survival or profitability and competition by the many for the limited number of top desirable positions offering top rewards for those who aspire to be among the elite.

The second problem in American capitalism is the effect that the cost of doing business has on the small business owner. 'Mom and pop' retail stores and small businesses are increasingly squeezed out of business by big corporation chains that successfully function on smaller profits per item due to the aggregate revenues acquired from large scale volume, which is not available to most small businesses. Thus, it is increasingly difficult for small businesses to compete unless they offer consumers a scarce product or individualized personal service not operationally feasible for large corporations.

These types of problems having been acknowledged, I maintain that capitalism is still the best economic system the world has ever known and has brought more prosperity to a greater percent of the population as well as more hope for those seeking human flourishing through self-actualization than any other economic system, including pre-capitalistic, communistic and socialistic societies. MacIntyre claims that this argument that capitalism maximizes workers economic prosperity, although true, is "irrelevant as a rebuttal" to his charges of the injustices of capitalism (MacIntyre 2006: 151). The Marxist view he articulates is the issue of evaluating the value of labor's contribution to productivity and the justifications for asserting what a worker is entitled to claim as his or her entitlement for their contribution.

He cites for example pre-modern societies in which production is carried on to meet primarily local needs and all excess is shared as a benefit by all of those who participate (MacIntyre 2006: 148). This however is analogous to the modern corporation sharing in the form of annual bonuses with non-union employees, profits derived by the hard work and contributions of employees. Just last week, the corporation that I work for announced that due to overcoming losses of the past and restoring to a position of profitability last year that the corporation is giving all employees 15 shares of stock as a gift. The corporation was not under any obligation to do this. It did so in recognition of the employee's contribution to improved profitability and simply exercising a good business practice. Union employees also share in profits that are allocated to fund the benefits derived from future union contract negotiations. All disbursements of funds to labor and management are by necessity derived from income and profits not distributed to stockholders. So the arguments of injustice to those who contribute to production or profit fails as structurally systemic of corporations as such, and can only be argued against specific individual corporations that fail to value the contribution of their workforce. Likewise, that argument can be reversed to apply to unions that cripple the long term survivability of corporations by demanding excessive pay or benefits disproportional to the value of their labor under threat of disrupting operations of a corporation by means of a strike that entails a temporary reduction of revenues while sustaining fixed overhead expense. This is exactly the position that American automobile manufactures are in due to the burden of excessive health care cost associated with union benefits. Again I would argue that it is whether labor or management negotiates from a position of reasonableness that constitutes justice or injustice, not the inherent structural nature of capitalism.

What gives capitalism its particular ethical and economic characteristic is the same double-edge sword that contributes to its shortcomings: competition and cooperative sharing of economic resources for individual and corporate benefit. The first element is that all relationships within capitalism are totally voluntary. Employees and employers mutually accept the terms of employment, which include payment of wages for services rendered and the employee's use of the employer's assets to render his services. Using the employer's tools of production is one element that distinguishes an employee from an independent contractor. The relationship of businesses to their suppliers and their consumers is also mutually voluntary. Both price and sales of products or services are established through principles of supply and demand. Those unwilling to accept the terms of available employment may chose to invest their personal resources in entrepreneurship. Those unwilling to pay the price of goods and services may elect to do without or make their own products for themselves if possible. The profits derived from investing personal or borrowed resources is ethically justified by virtue of voluntary exchange of values in an economically sound way that is capable of retaining a portion of revenues above cost. Those who do not possess the resources, skill or risk-temperament to be an entrepreneur can maximize the return on the utilization of the skills they have for sale by offering them to the highest bidding employer. Freedom to direct one's own life as one sees fit is one aspect that the free market accommodates. The question of whether one makes wise choices is an entirely different issue connected to an individual's expression of their rational autonomy. Good judgments and actions bring desired goods. Bad judgments and actions bring undesired ramifications. Thus, the necessity to acquire the wisdom to choose and act wisely.

As a final comment in this section on capitalism and management I wish to comment on the distinction that is made within Aristotelianism of actions for non-productive purposes such as action for internal contemplation of universal concepts (energeia) and actions that are specifically related to the production of goods and services (poiesis). I find that the distinction is not relevant to considerations of what constitutes excellence, unless the operational definition of productive activity was limited to rote, repetitious activity that can easily be replaced by mechanistic technology. There are internal goods that may be judged by standards of excellence relative to the performance of a person engaged in philosophical contemplation to solve or acquire insight into the nature of a conceptual dilemma, just as there are standards of excellence that may be considered in judging the creation of a product or service. Take for example the creation of a photograph of an attractive female model. The creativity involved in conceptualizing an appropriate mood to be expressed by the female model, both in terms of facial expression and pose, communicating that mood and eliciting that exact mood from the model, as well as recognizing when it is achieved and photographing it at the exact instance in which it manifests its optimum state is equivalent to the example of the portrait painter MacIntyre cites in After Virtue (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 189) in which the painter incorporates a certain form of naturalism to an iconic portrait practice that was formerly constructed to display an image that may not have borne any resemblance to the actual person, say of Jesus or St. Peter.

The photographer in my example takes what is and molds it into an artistic version of itself through interaction. The product produced also possesses characteristics that were a result of technical artistic decisions by the photographer such as the optimum depth of field employed that determines what elements in the photograph will be in focus and which deliberately placed out of focus, selective compositional cropping and various lighting considerations. His performance in executing his skills, which produced a product, contain internal goods relative to his participation in the creative practice and external goods of possible appreciation, payment for his services, public recognition, etc. Similarly, a business manager who creates an Excel spreadsheet to evaluate 'what if' scenarios of possible negotiation strategies or to create 'test case' scenarios to evaluate whether a new computer program will execute its function in a way that provides the anticipated results that was assigned to a developer to produce is another example of producing a product, in this case an Excel spreadsheet, in which its design, selected formulas and analytical properties contain internal goods and external goods based on the excellence of its producer.

The ultimate justification of management is not the recognition of expertise for the sake of expertise. The practice of management constitutes expertise in areas such as execution theory and application so that it may specifically utilize those expertises to accomplish the objectives of a corporation, department or assigned task. It is a rare manager who excels at what he does and only performs for external goods such as money and status. To perform at a level of excellence by definition entails total immersion in the nature of internal goods. Mercenary artists, managers or warriors devoid of the requisite commitment, of course would not qualify for my definition of excellence. Thus, I would agree with much of Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy as outlined by MacIntyre in After Virtue and MacIntyre's "skeletal outline [of] a process first from the Enlightenment's ideal for a social science to the aspirations of social reformers . . . to the theoretically informed managerial practice of the contemporary technocratic expert" (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 86). The result of managerial products whether physical or goals accomplished may certainly be evaluated as practices comprising internal and external goods which constitute the nature of excellence. Naturally, not all managers or corporations achieve this level of performance, and Weber's term bureaucracy can be misleading to infer only implementation of rule-based activity without involvement of independent judgment. This is less likely in corporate life than in the modern state's bureaucracy, which functions on an entirely difference basis from which I have been describing. It is to these differences in politics and economics that promote or restrain human flourishing that I now turn.

Politics, Economics and The Modern State

In the fall of 1976, as a senior at Boston University, I enrolled in my second of two courses presented by Alasdair MacIntyre. Even at this point in his academic career he was considered the most brilliant philosophical intellectual at the university. This course was entitled "Morals, Politics and the Emergence of Modernity." It provided uncanny insight into the nature of the conflict between the modern state and the economy, which provides us with an understanding of the foundational reasons why the modern state is doomed to failure. I shall later argue that politicians engage in practices that make a bad situation worse due to their ignorance or wanton disregard for reality and the interest of citizens, which stems from their belief that they will not be personally held accountable for their actions or they rationalize that by the time that the public realizes their complicity in detrimental acts, they will be out of office and will not have to deal with the public fall out.

What follows is the main thread of MacIntyre's response to a question I posed at the beginning of a class and his insightful description of the transition from pre-capitalist society to the modern state and the oscillation between the economy and the modern state, as well as the oscillation of movement towards and away from individualism. I believe his insight is as applicable to understanding today's political paralysis as it was 31 years ago. It will provide conference participants with a detailed explanation of where we currently stand and why there is a need for a wholesale change in our understanding of political institutions in the modern state and whether they can provide a means to promote individual freedoms or provide an environment in which it is at least possible for humans to flourish without being impeded by the hand of government. Although I have endeavored to meticulously provide as accurate of a representation of MacIntyre's views as possible based on my class notes, and my general understanding of his views from three decades ago, I nonetheless take full responsibility for any errors stemming from my condensation, paraphrasing or inadvertent failure to articulate the depth and nuances of his extraordinary views (MacIntyre 1976). It is equally possible that he may have changed his views on some of the concepts that I attribute to him, but only he can speak to this point.

MacIntyre - April 1976

My question went something like this. I kind of got the impression that you feel that the transition from relying upon nature for an economic base to capitalism as an artificial economy is a big step backwards that has tremendous ill consequences. I wonder if you might elaborate on why you think we are in such a poor state of affairs now for relying upon a capitalist economy. In other words, in what way is dependence on capitalism vs. nature a step backward?

He responded that what he had been trying to do is to talk about what it was to enter the modern world. His view was that entry into the modern world was made with individualism and with the creation of certain institutions which belong to individualism. These are certain very specific types of economic and political institutions. To be modern, MacIntyre asserted, is in fact participating in institutions of these kinds and sharing these concepts. Shared concepts and participation are not two separate things. They are the same phenomenon described from different points of view.

The development of the modern economy and the development of the modern state occurred in relative independence of each other. In England the modern economy developed and became a model for all other economies. In Germany the modern state developed and came to become to some degree a model for all other states. The consequence of their independent development is that the modern state and the modern economy are a mismatch. Far from the modern state being a reflection or production of the modern economy, in many ways the modern economy and the modern state are necessarily at cross-purposes.

He then proceeded to vindicate his thesis by first bringing out certain characteristics of the modern economy, which is itself a kind of theory. It is not merely economic activity, but economic activity understood normatively in a certain way. The understanding of economic activity was first supplied partly by Adam Smith and even more by David Ricardo, then later by marginalists and other economic theorists. The most important aspect about the modern economy is that it has to expand or perish. Which is to say that for a modern economy to remain relatively stable, for there not to be large dislocating amounts of unemployment or loss of productive power, the economy has to be in relatively continuous expansion. This is a central Marxist thesis about capitalism that claims that in order for it to survive it must expand and that there are certain inherent limits to this expansion. When these limits are reached capitalism must break down.

MacIntyre did not argue for or against this thesis. He said he did not actually believe it. He believed that there are no inherent limits or points in which capitalism must break down. He believed that Lenin came to the same conclusion citing that a necessary break down is not arguably entailed by Volume three of Capital. But whatever the truth of these matters, all that's essential for MacIntyre's thesis is that so long as capitalism lasts there has to be an expanding economy.

Secondly, in order to expand it requires an ever increasing amount of capital. And here he acknowledged that he was again skirting a Marxist thesis. The Marxist theses that it must inevitably come to a worldly end because there is necessarily a failing rate of profit within the capitalist system. But whether this is true or not, MacIntyre said, it is true that at each stage of the development capitalism has to produce greater and greater resources for the purpose of reinvestment. For to produce the same rate of expansion you need to produce larger resources at each stage. This brings out one crucial contrast between a capitalist economy and a pre-capitalist economy. It's one that has various effects in which a man loses his dependence on nature. In an agricultural society it is generally the case that so long as the soil can be kept fertile and so long as you have the minimum tools, the cost of setting an extra pair of hands to work is minimal. Therefore, the more people working the better. The notion of a surplus population is only one in which there is a surplus based upon what nature provides. There are plenty of surplus populations in the world. There are plenty of cases where nature in fact, given the technology of a society, is productive up to a point and then that population can no longer be supported.

But, in a capitalist economy, MacIntyre explained, a corollary to the fact that it takes an ever increasing amount of capital to maintain the rate of expansion is it takes an ever increasing amount of capital to set one person to work. The amount of capital that was required in 1976 to set a person to work was between $20,000 to $30,000. Thus, it is clear that given these facts, it becomes more and more expensive to maintain the economy. More and more of the economy goes into maintaining the economy so that economic activity becomes more and more absorbent. If you look at the questions that preoccupy individuals in government from 1700 to the 1800's to now you will find that more and more, everybody is preoccupied with economic questions. This is not the same as the simple preoccupation that each individual has with maintaining himself. That's constant, he reminds us. But, what is clear for the community is that it has to spend more and more of its energy in order to maintain the economic system. The economic system, therefore, becomes more and more absorbing as an end and less and less as a means. One of the great differences between technology in an economy in which men are dependent upon nature from technology in a modern economy is the technology and the economy become less and less of means and more and more of ends beyond which men cannot see. That is, the relationship of economic to non-economic changes significantly.

It is also the case that because the economy must expand continuously that it must increase demand and the expansion of the modern economy parallels with ever expanding horizons of consumption. Which means that it has to be maintained. At the same time the modern economy continuously generates the following phenomenon. It continuously generates obsolescence. He doesn't mean obsolescence in the way that it is sometimes uses. He means the following. Capital has to move to where it can get a very simple high rate of profit. It is not true, in fact it's untrue that capital has to move to where it can get the highest rate of profit. It doesn't have to get the highest rate of profit at any instance in time. But, it has to get a high rate of profit in order for it to enable it to continuously expand in the economy.

This means that very large sectors of the economy fall into decay as they cease to be profitable. That capital has to move out of them. It is no accident that you see decaying industries in decaying neighborhoods in capitalism. From this there is a kind of movement from that which once yielded a return relative to the market to that which will now yield a return relative to the market. He points out that if you look at transportation you will see there is a movement away from railways to certain kinds of road transportation to certain kinds of air transportation and so on. With every mode of transportation becoming menaced when it becomes unprofitable or looks like it may or will be unprofitable. This means continually generating unemployment of various kinds.

In one of the changes in the development of capitalism, two things happened early on. One is that more and more people become incapable of using the skills or the intelligence they have. They are no longer wanted at one particular moment. There is no reason why capitalism shouldn't coexist with large sectors of unemployment permanently, by people who can't be absorbed or aren't needed in the economy. This is the real unfortunate crux for unemployed minorities or immigrants. The real crux is that there is no good reason economically to train those who are outside of the economic system. If you do train them, give them special education, recognize special needs, you can actually only bring them into the economy generally by giving them real jobs, and not just subsidies. By giving them real jobs you can only bring them into the economy by those jobs not being done by someone who is already trained for them. The notion that you can continuously absorb more and more sectors of labor is just false.

Now, all this MacIntyre explains produces a situation in which every individual is pushed into the protection of local and particular interest, such as unions or special interest groups. It is the maximization of self-interest of both individuals and groups that are produced by and exercises a powerful causal effect upon the economy.

Next, is an absolutely crucial point. Industrial revolutions are generally extremely unpleasant. The first English Industrial Revolution was in many ways extremely unpleasant. The Soviet Russian Industrial Revolution was extremely unpleasant. India and China he suspects were extremely unpleasant in various ways. It isn't that people's standard of living may not in some way rise continuously in industrial revolutions, but the essences of an industrial revolution is that you gain the momentum to acquire a modern industrial economy by extracting from people a surplus that you invest and that you prevent them from consuming. Every industrial revolution can only occur if there are systematic devices for keeping down the consumption of those who are actually doing the work of society. Therefore, every industrial revolution is inegalitarian.

Every industrial revolution is carried through by a group who are systematically exploiting the workers in order to carry through the revolution. There is no way in which you can have an egalitarian revolution. The notion of an egalitarian industrial revolution is pure fantasy. This is not to say that there aren't nastier and nicer revolutions. You don't have to be like Stalin he emphasizes. But, you probably do have to be like Mrs. Gandhi.

What is quite clear is that the sequel to an industrial revolution in a modern economy is generally a period in which pressures from the working class assures concessions both in consumption and in expression of need. It may not be direct political democracy or anything like that, but you acquire a working class that has had much hardship to a certain point and at a given point then demands a much larger consumer share. The problem with the modern economies, therefore, is always reconciling this with the need for the economy to expand. And the problem with all modern economics is how do you prevent the population from consuming now in the interest of future consumption.

The second central problem for a modern economy, he continues, is that all modern economies are inherently destabilizing and when they are destabilizing it is because there are too many factors going on. That is the difficulty of keeping the whole thing going, because something is always going wrong somewhere. Chronologically that is what happens. There are beautiful theoretical models of modern economies in which nothing ever goes wrong. In practice, something is going wrong all the time. There are all sorts of tensions between different sectors.

This is something that doesn't have to be made very precise, he explains. It is compatible with a great many precise theories. There has been many quarrels about how you would precisely specify many of these tendencies, but he believes it is compatible with almost any theory that has any plausibility.

Next, we consider the modern state. But, first he draws a very quick but important contrast between the modern state and the most important forms of government that are found before the modern state. The most important forms of government found before the modern state are twofold. There is the kind of central administration which maintains public order and military defense, which collects taxes and creates a central bureaucracy in order to provide the administrative substructure for these functions, and which may undertake certain other tasks such as the building of roads or irrigation and other tasks of these kinds, but which otherwise leaves the vast mass of the population alone. So, the population's transactions with government will be limited to possibly military service, the payment of taxes and resorts to the courts.

This sort of government need never go bankrupt. If it does go bankrupt, it goes bankrupt for the same reason that a student might go bankrupt; simply by allowing expenditures to exceed income. The remedy is very simple, either increase income, tax people more if they will bear it or decrease expenditures. There are no insoluble economic problems for a government of this kind. They may in fact become insoluble and a government may get into an incredible mess by getting into all sorts of projects, create bureaucracies and may involve itself needlessly in all sorts of things, but there is nothing in the nature of this kind of government, as such.

One of the major factors in the decline of the Roman Empire he points out is the fact that small farming became for independent reasons increasingly unprofitable in a period in which taxation had to be raised to maintain a large standing army to defeat the Barbarian invasion, and therefore there was a gradual breakdown since taxation destroyed the economic base, i.e., small farmers from whom the taxes were collected. In the end, there was nobody left to tax. This was due to the accident of the Barbarian invasions and the nature of agriculture. It didn't spring from the nature of the Roman government, as such. There was no reason why, as such, the Roman government had to go bankrupt. Given certain agriculture phenomenon and certain military phenomenon, yes, MacIntyre explains, it did have to go bankrupt. But, nothing, as such.

The second kind of traditional government is one in which the state allows the administration of a city by a city - either as in ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy, elsewhere too, but particularly there - where a city governs itself and does something much more than public order, justice and military defense. It is normally also engaged in the joint provision of public services. The city functions sort of as a communal household and its interest may extend as widely as do the interest of the free citizen. Both in ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy the free citizens were of course only half of the population. The appearance of government is communal. The government is the community organizing itself in a particularly way. Now such communities are much more likely to be dependent on external trade than the Roman Empire or medieval kingdom. The city is likely to specialize. It is likely to have commitments from part of its population in the country side from which it receives agricultural produce and to which it sells goods. The appearance of the city is much more like an individual household or an individual firm in its economics.

The claims to loyalty of the state and of citizens in these two cases are also different, but quite intelligible MacIntyre explains. In the case of the medieval kingdom or the Roman Empire there was a notion of imperium or some kind of divinely given authority he points out. In the case of the city-state, the force of authority is we ourselves in the city; not just persons of the present, but also those of the past. There are other elements to this that are complex, but what he wants to emphasize is the crucial difference between either of these types of governments and the modern state. The modern state differs drastically in its relationship to the economy, and in the kind of authority it claims.

He then turns to the relationship of the modern state with the economy. The modern state has two main tasks in relation to the economy. It has to correct the imbalances of the economy and it has to do what the economy cannot do. That is there are all sorts of services that will never be productive in private hands. Therefore, the state has to provide them if they are to be provided at all, and since these services are essential to the working of the modern economy, although they are not productive for the modern economy, they are not profit making, therefore, the state has to provide them. There are certain forms of transportation and education that typically are provided by the state, postal services, etc,. are services that the state has to provide. At the same time, the state has to continuously cope with all those people who the economy cannot cope with.

The modern economy is continuously producing unemployment, populations of the ill, the mentally ill, the old, and there is no way of providing for them in the conventional economic system. How does the state provide for them? It does it in two ways. First, it creates state agencies. And these agencies are of course economically unproductive. That is you pull out of the labor force each time you create a state agency, skilled manpower, and you thereby impoverish the economy. You make the economy worse; sometime hopelessly. And, secondly, in order to provide the agency with resources you use taxation. Therefore, the law of being a modern state is to continuously increase the non-productive sector of the economy and continually penalize the productive sector of the economy. Which means this process continually aggravates the very conditions that the modern state is trying to solve. Therefore, he introduces you to 'MacIntyre's Law of the Modern State,' which asserts that all states are going bankrupt, some faster than others.

All states are going bankrupt because the ability of the modern state to finance itself out of taxation is self-defeating, because every time the state increases its taxation it worsens the economy which it depends upon to tax. Now, how quickly bankruptcy comes in the modern state of course depends on contingent factors. Why is this important apart from when it does go bankrupt that we will all feel it rather hard? The answer is that the problem is not just that the modern state has an economic function, but that it's holding together its economic and political function not by the nature of its physical character, but by the fact that it demands an allegiance from us. And, the reason for its demand is essentially paternal or maternal.

The state essentially claims our loyalty on the grounds that it will in various ways protect us. The problem is that the state's inability to control the economy necessarily erodes this claim. The result is that there are more and more people who are dependent upon the state and at the same time have less and less reason for loyalty to the state. Bertrand de Jouvenel pointed out a long time ago that every time that resources are distributed from one sector of the population to another, as for example by redistributive taxation, what happens is not that those who receive the redistributive income become more independent, but rather become clients of the state. That is the state acquires more and more dependents. There are more and more people who directly depend on the state.

Now, those who manage the state are therefore, if this argument is correct, always in an intolerant dilemma. One of these is that they are continuously pushed on one hand to produce programs and agencies that will enable them to cope with the instabilities created by the economy, and there are always new ones, and on the other hand each time they do this they depress the economy and they cause the very conditions that they are trying to alleviate. Therefore, characteristically in the modern world, politics is a matter of two parties, one of whom advocates programs to alleviate economic hardships and the other of whom continuously talks about freeing the economy from state control. Therefore, politics in the modern state becomes an oscillation between these two positions. The important thing to understand is of course what these two positions share is much more important than what they disagree about. And that the two positions require each other. That is why MacIntyre explains that the Democratic Party has to constantly reinvent the Republican Party. The great danger for the Democratic Party is that the Republican Party will die out and then the Democratic Party would just have to split to create an opposing party to which it could engage in a continuing oscillating relationship, thereby retaining its relevance. He says this in the context that there is no way of conducting politics within the framework essentially but in terms of this particular kind of oscillation between the two parties.

In addition to the problem of the oscillation between the modern state's attempt to control the economy there is a second type of oscillation which involves a movement toward and away from individualism. By leaving everything politically and economically up to the individual, MacIntyre says, leads to intolerable situations that then lead to movement away from individualism. There is a great deal of rhetoric about reconciling freedom and order, but its whole function is to disguise the incoherence of culture's dominant notions of freedom and order. Thus, we have what appears to be insolvable problems. Given these restraints if follow that there is something very wrong with most theories of power. The first is the pluralist theory, according to which power is widely distributed among different groups and agencies and the important thing according to it is the disbursal of power. Politics is then the coming together of different groups and agencies and working out in the bargaining process how their different interest can be reconciled. Second, there is the theory advanced by C. Wright Mills in his book The Power Elite, according to which power is exercised by a relatively small group that manages to dominate the rest of society through various economic and political means.

MacIntyre argues that both of these theories of power are false, because they each assume that there is a lot of power around. Whereas, in MacIntyre's view, there is almost none. What we are impressed by is fundamentally powerlessness and not power. That is because the interplay between the modern economy and the modern state is such that the range of choices open to any particular individual is usually enormously restricted. He cites Dwight Eisenhower's complaints of how what appeared to him outside the presidency to be very simple things did not turn out that way once president. 'How to books' written for presidents such as Presidential Power by Richard Neustadt written for John Kennedy is premised on organizing the executive branch administratively so they will get power. But MacIntyre says that what you can hope for by organizational change is severely limited precisely because the shape of politics is dictated by the relations between the state and the economy. Thus, presidents find out in office that there is almost nothing that they can do.

The only exception in which the modern state really has complete control of the economy is in time of war in which people believe that their national identity is threatened. World War II is the best example in which both England and the United States converted their whole economic industrial capability to war-time production, which is to say that individuals voluntarily subordinated their private interest to the needs of the state in time of war. I would say that for America, since the debate during the Vietnam War of whether that war in any way actually threatened American national interest, let alone its identity, that since then the state's ability to control the economy even in time of war is seriously diminished as evidenced by the current debate over the Iraq war.

It is therefore apparent that given the framework that MacIntyre has described above of the modern state that the declared objectives of most politicians amount to mere rhetoric and not real options given the adverse effects upon the economy of most of their objectives. Granted, there may be some who sincerely want to use state bureaucracies to provide services to those in need, but most of them eventually see the futility of their intentions. Quite typically, action is taken for the sake of actions to provide the illusion that progress is taking place. Most political action is tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the sinking Titanic. Some experienced politicians know the dynamic just discussed but refuse to publicly acknowledge it because it would threaten the perpetuation of those who benefit from the status quo. The primary objective of politicians today is simply to gain power and maintain power for power's sake. That is why nothing substantial ever happens when governments change parties. Sure there are some minor shifts in economic activity, increases or decreases in taxes, widening or contraction of the social 'safety net' and expansion or contraction of civil rights and freedom, but by and large there is primarily only an increase in obstacles for individuals to overcome in trying to flourish due to increased government regulation and pervasive taxation and an increase in the number of laws that one may potentially violate, which in turn diminishes individual freedom to act and erodes personal liberty.

As the population's confidence in government diminishes and as frustration increases with the number of obstacles imposed by the modern state that impedes or outright prevents individuals from flourishing, in spite of their individual efforts, it becomes evident that it is time for a revolutionary change in the relationship between those who govern and those who are subjected to the rule of the modern state. We no longer live in a world where only the poor or the working class requires relief. All people, from the poor to the middle class to the rich and the very rich require relief from the overreach and authoritative control of the modern state. I believe given the frustration of those who articulate their pain as well as those of the great 'silent majority' who don't verbalize their anxiety, but suffer with it nonetheless, that the timing may be right to consider MacIntyre's revolutionary Aristotelianism as a path from the treadmill of our current circumstances to a new possible beginning. Before looking at a few steps that could bring Aristotelian ideas first into public consideration and then into reality, let's turn briefly to the issue of incommensurate values in the modern liberal state.

Ethics and Moral Relativism

It has become such a common occurrence today for individuals engaged in pleasant conversation to suddenly realize that the person to whom they are speaking has just said something that represents a moral value totally contrary to one's own moral values. Some people immediately sidestep the issue choosing not to reveal their own set of values. Others encourage discussion of the issue to assure themselves that they accurately understood what the other person just said or to get a better understanding of the other person's point of view on the issue. The more confident one feels about their own moral grounding and their capacity to discuss possibly controversial topics with another in an intellectually, respectful conversational style, the more likely one will engage the other on such topics as a matter of interesting conversation. To have such polite, informative, interesting and enjoyable conversations require the capacity to respectfully engage in concepts that stem from other traditions of thought that rival one's own tradition. Sometimes the participants learn to appreciate a different point of view and become open to even changing or modifying their own point of view. Other times the conversation is simply a form of entertainment for no reason other than the sheer pleasure of exchanging concepts with an enjoyable person while passing time in one another's company. Sometimes of course the conversation has the potential to turn embarrassing, too self-revealing, frustrating or may even turn hostile as participants struggle to make their point defensible or become insulted that the other person cannot appreciate the wisdom of their perspective or logic. If a party to such a conversation has seriously misjudged the other person they may even find they have just made an enemy or worse, as the conversation may turn deadly.

Now how do we explain the multitude of experiences and possible human conclusions posed above, which are all based on the same conversational activity of discussing competing moral perspectives? There are two elements at play here. First, most people do not have a deep theoretical understanding of why they believe what they believe. That is to say that they have not invested the time and personal analytical effort necessary to arrive at intelligible first principles that support their premises that entail their conclusions. Second, there is no general consensus of what constitutes valid moral concepts and practices, by what basis one moral tradition is any more justified than another and how to deal with the 'gray areas' that inevitably seem to occur when making judgments involving competing notions of interest or of the good. There are two reasons why most people do not have a clear understanding of what they think they believe.

The first reason is frequently people adopt their belief systems from their social environment, e.g., from their parents, their friends, their religion, their education or indoctrination or their aimless self-talk that takes root through repetition. Many people simply want to fit-in and that is much more important to them than principles. The second reason that people maintain very shaky beliefs is what I alluded to earlier. People are so filled with fear, frustration and insecurities that the idea of examining their beliefs or looking for rational grounds to support their ethical code might so shatter their shaky foundation that any possible benefit promised is insufficient to counteract the fear of being permanently adrift in an already incomprehensible world. Most people are barely hanging on, which is why they fight so emotionally to support whatever perspective they employ to justify their past, but also to maintain their capacity to face yet another day of choices in which the outcomes of their choices seem not only unpredictable, but also not necessarily causally connected to what they perceive as components of their choice or executed actions. I have acquired this perspective of the general public from not only my conversations with many casual acquaintances over the years, but particularly from my involvement with people in the political process and my observations of comments made by people who today are able to have their one paragraph comments posted on newspaper websites that permit the public to comment on news stories or editorial commentary. I am also amazed and alarmed at the effectiveness of political television ads and literature mailed to voters. The public can be manipulated and swayed so easily by rhetoric that it is very understandable why they can appropriately be characterized as "Dazed and Confused," a song composed by guitar legend Jimmy Page on Led Zeppelin's 1969 debut album.

Now, I mention all this because I want to comment on an important issue that MacIntyre has often raised with respect to a commensurable public standard in articulating moral beliefs, whether they be drawn from a view of Hume, Kant or Mill on the one hand, or drawn from Aristotle and Aquinas on the other hand, and the liberal states' desire to render moral judgment in a way that "is independent of the human good" (MacIntyre 1990: 360). It is a complex issue in which time and space does not allow me to fully explore all of the ethical and political considerations in this conference paper. However, I have devoted considerable space to these issues in my forthcoming book In Defense of Individuality (Poirier 2007), which examines in depth the nature of contemporary American political processes and the current state of ethics in modernity, as well as Hegel's influence on the development of the modern state. However, here I can say that in spite of a concerted effort on the part of political parties to sway the public's view on morality, America, by and large, continues to remain predominately attached to individualistic precepts and norms, which I believe are beneficial to human flourishing. At the same time, a lack of rational, ethical, justificatory standards to appeal to in public debate of moral issues is most counterproductive. Christopher Lutz in his excellent book Tradition In The Ethics of Alasdair MacIntrye highlights his understanding of MacIntyre's distinction between relativism and rationality in the example of an Athenian sophist claiming that there is no such thing as justice as such, only justice as understood in different cities. Lutz explains with respect to the nature of virtue that "While the rationality of judgments concerning human excellence remains relative to culture, the truth about human excellence does not" (Lutz 2004: 67). As to whether the state should directly link moral judgments to a specific view of the human good, I wish to point out the benefit and the danger.

Continued in Part 2 . . . .

larger view

Part 2 Continued below 

Ushering in MacIntyre's Notions of Political Transformation in Modernity

By Richard Poirier

The following is an address presented at the Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia conference at London Metropolitan University June 29 to July 1, 2007.

Part 2 Continued . . . . . . . . . 

The benefit is instructing or reminding individuals that their duty to themselves is to make choices that are in their best interest. To promote a public discussion of what constitutes one's best interest would indeed be beneficial to both individuals and the public good. A discussion of one's best interest entail a discussion of what constitutes the good and any public discussion of the good is good. An issue which is often misunderstood by some traditions is the nature of the justification of any moral code from an individualist premise. The argument might run that Adam Smith's appeal to 'sympathy' or the counsel of 'the man within the breast' to be morally just or Kant's 'categorical imperatives' provides no reason for why one should subordinate one's apparent self-interest to the dictates of impartial moral rules. The presupposition of this dilemma is the assumption that individualism only constitutes a view of self-interested immediacy. All actions need to be considered in light of a sufficient context and the fact that life is a continuum. What may appear to be a benefit today or at the moment may have long term detriments. Therefore, self-interest needs to always be considered in the light that others exist in our world and our actions often have an effect on others. Which is not to say that we should put the interest of others before ourselves as a primary objective, rather that one should be aware of the interest of others and that their interest should be taken into account when one makes decisions about their own interest. I, therefore, introduce perhaps a new way of understanding individualism in what I call 'Cooperative Individualism' to bridge the gap between those who think individualism is incompatible with the public good.

The danger of the state defining what constitutes the public good is of course it misusing its definition to justify a road to totalitarian rule, as in George Orwell's examples of "newspeak, doublethink" in 1984 (Orwell 1949: 25) or in Josef Pieper's warning of manipulation and "indifference regarding the truth" in his excellent book Abuse of Language -- Abuse of Power (Pieper 1974 /1992: 17). I mention these ideas as examples of the type of fruitful debate that can occur as one possibility of MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism taking root in public debate. Through engagement in serious public debate of the notions of liberalism in the modern state contrasted with Aristotle's reasonable approach to ethics of moderation and his doctrine of the 'Golden Mean' in the Nicomachean Ethics, (Aristotle 384-322 BCE), society will have a much greater chance of coming to more of a general consensus of what constitutes the good than if people are unwilling to discuss issues because they believe achieving consensus is hopeless or that there is no value in considering opposing points of view. I have every reason to believe that individuals and the society they comprise would benefit from the insight of Aristotle, Aquinas and MacIntyre. Now on to how to promote their ideas into the mainstream of society.

Ushering in MacIntyre's Notions of Political Transformation

There are several ways to introduce new ideas into society in such a way as to have a real transformational effect. Due to the many different classifications of people that make up society, one approach or method will not be sufficient. It is necessary to use the appropriate method for each different social group. Sophisticated technical philosophy books are excellent in communicating to academic audiences and public intellectuals. But, it is also necessary to influence those in society who influence others, namely those who influence the content of major newspapers, television and radio newsrooms and television programming departments as well as internet sites and the new communication transmitters of our time, the bloggers. Ideas can be posted on newspapers' websites and social networks sites such as MySpace.com and other similar sites that attract millions of teenagers. One of the most powerful communication modes today is the song and accompanying music video. Just as drummer/composer Neil Peart in 1976 incorporated ideas of Ayn Rand (Rand 1961) into the lyrics of Canadian rock band Rush, and Christian orientated bands have done the same with their songs, artists could be encouraged to incorporate Aristotelian concepts into their lyrics.

Television and film writers could be encouraged to incorporate Aristotelian themes into their screenplays. An effective device in politics today is creating non-profit 501(c)(3) businesses and producing videos that articulate the concept of the non-profit for public consumption in various outlets. Cable television offer low-cost production and on-air exposure to small and large markets. Conferences of this kind are excellent to communicate awareness of Aristotle's philosophy and MacIntyre tremendous contribution to this tradition. However, conferences also provide a topic or theme that constitutes a separate element that can be the subject matter of a publicity campaign which can be promoted in numerous ways to reach different audiences.

Books about Aristotle and MacIntrye could be donated to schools for the purpose of students reading them and writing papers about what they read for the purpose of winning a contest or scholarship. A speaker's bureau could be established in which speakers make themselves available to speak at numerous kinds of events from small club luncheons to major talk shows. Merchandizing items such as tee-shirts, posters, coffee mugs, etc., could be sold to raise money for other promotional ideas. Political speechwriters could be persuaded to incorporate ideas into political speeches, and even though this could be risky because a politician's subsequence acts may be contrary to the ideas promoted in their speech creating confusion in the minds of the public. Nonetheless, even controversy itself can generate benefits in exposing good ideas to the masses. Ultimately, candidates associated with these ideas may be elected to office and implement some of these ideas into public practice. There is no limit to the possibility of how a worthy idea can take hold on society once a little momentum has got underway. I have argued that the public is extremely unhappy and looking for relief from their fears and anger. Although they are rightfully skeptical of new ideas from anyone, they are also hungry for leadership and a new direction. The time is now.

Now, one may ask how MacIntyre feels about the prospects of his ideas taking hold in society? Based on my conversation with him on November 30, 2006 at a conference on Modernity at Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, I would say he is not very optimistic that his ideas will take hold on a large scale level due to the very nature of the modern liberal state. It is my impression that he feels that more good can be accomplished on a small scale community basis where the complexities of the bureaucracy of the state are not as pervasive. So, one might ask why I see possibilities that he does not. My answer is first that I am an optimist, and second that I am reminded of something that MacIntyre said about Adam Smith 31 years ago. He said that there is a passage, seldom noted, in The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776/1952) in which Smith says that it is more impossible for the system of economy that he is describing to ever actually be instituted in England than the laws of utopia should be enacted. He thought he was describing an imaginary, but possible world, which would not actually materialize. The reason that it would not materialize is that it would conflict with the interest of too many rich and powerful people. Well, notwithstanding Smith's lack of optimism on the prospects of his economic theory of capitalism flourishing, it has indeed flourished and not conflicted with the interest of rich and powerful people. And, so I conclude by theorizing that the same may be true for Alasdair MacIntyre's Aristotelian notions of political and ethical transformations in modernity. Today's conference may indeed be an indicator of a mass transformation looming in the near distance.

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Bibliography

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